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The present  government has inherited an economy characterised by low growth, high inflation, high 
current account deficit and large fiscal imbalance at the Union level. What has struck me about 
Union budget 2014-15 is not the fiscal arithmetic, but the macroeconomic framework. One could 
sense a deal for fiscal-monetary policy co-ordination in the budget speech, especially with the 
announcement of Finance Minister for a “New Monetary framework”.  The paper focuses on the 
macroeconomic framework of the budget rather than dealing with the fiscal arithmetic, in terms of 
policy announcements and budgetary allocations. 
The dynamics between North Block and Mint Road is always challenging, and so far India has 
witnessed a fiscal dominance, over monetary policy.The announcement by Finance Minister on 
“new monetary framework” for India needs to be co-read with the advancements in RBI seeking 
more „central bank independence‟  to manage inflation  and how it plays out in the macroeconomic 
context of India in light of the Expert Committee to Revise and Strengthen the Monetary Policy Framework 
(Urjit Patel Committee report). 
The underlying macroeconomic framework of the budget revealed two thematic priorities of the 
present government; (i) growth revival and (ii) macroeconomic stability. This sets the track. The 
Union budget was simultaneously ensuring a „continuity‟ and „change‟.  The „continuity‟ elements in 
the budget may be to ensure a bipartisan approach in tackling the issues of national interest, 
especially in case of fiscal consolidation path of earlier government. However the „changes‟ 
suggested in the budget in terms of new monetary framework is disturbing. 
 
I. Fiscal Consolidation 
The growth revival and fiscal consolidation involve conflicts and tradeoffs. The Finance Minister‟s 
speech highlighted the significance of fiscal prudence. He was honest in accepting that controlling 
the fiscal deficit to 4.1 per cent of GDP in the current fiscal is the biggest challenge of the 
government.  The budget set the fiscal consolidation path for medium term, with the aim to reduce 
fiscal deficit to 3.6 per cent in 2015-16 and 3 per cent of GDP in 2016-17.  
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Though the Economic Survey highlighted that “India needs a sharp fiscal correction, a new Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act with teeth”, budget has not specified anything 
other than the accepted target of 3 per cent of GDP for fiscal deficit.However, the path of fiscal 
consolidation was vaguely spelled out that the target would be achieved with increase in revenue 
buoyancy than expenditure cuts.  This is a welcome shift.  However regarding the deficit targets, 
there is not much change in the present budget compared to the previous Interim budget (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Deficit Targets 
  2013-14 RE 2014-15 BE 2015-16 Target 2016-17 Target 
as % of  GDP 
Interim 
Budget  
General 
Budget 
Interim 
Budget  
General 
Budget 
Interim 
Budget  
General 
Budget 
Interim 
Budget  
General 
Budget 
Effective 
Revenue Deficit 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Revenue Deficit 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.0 2.2 1.5 1.6 
Fiscal Deficit 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.0 
Source: Government of India (2013, 2014): Budget documents, Ministry of Finance. 
These deficit targets are in conformity with the New FRBM rules adopted in September 2012.  The 
New FRBM envisaged that effective revenue deficit will be eliminated by 2015-16 and the revenue 
deficit will be controlled to sub-two per cent of GDP within same period. 
The path of fiscal consolidation is envisaged differently in the present budget, though the targets are 
kept the same.  The path of fiscal consolidation is set on an optimistic increase in the non-tax 
revenue estimate from 1.4 per cent of GDP to 1.7 per cent of GDP for 2014-15 (BE).  The nontax 
revenue is expected to rise on the account of dividend from RBI which has been revised by RBI 
following the new accounting practice recommended by the Malegam panel for the central bank for 
closure of its Annual accounts in June 2014. It is expected that Rs 46,000 crores will be paid to the 
government as dividend in 2014-15, as compared to Rs 33,000 crores in 2013-14.  
Revenue buoyancy is also expected from the non-debt capital receipts side, the Government has 
increased the disinvestment target from Rs. 36,925 crore as per interim budget to Rs. 43,425 crore in 
2014-15 (BE), with the estimate of divestment of Government stake in non-Government 
Companies remaining at Rs. 15,000 crore.  
The analytical framework of the fiscal consolidation highlighted by the Finance Minister was 
different from the earlier frameworks. The Finance Minister surprisingly has not highlighted the 
popular neo classical frameworks that fiscal deficits crowd out private investment or raising interest 
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rates. Empirical evidence revealed that fiscal deficits do not raise interest rates or crowd out private 
investment (Chakraborty 2002, 2007, 2008, Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 2006, Vinod, et al 2014) 
and proved a different discourse of link between fiscal policy stance and output. In the Union 
Budget 2014 rather what he highlighted as the framework of fiscal consolidation is the 
“intergenerational debt burden, that today‟s debt is next generation‟s tax burden”.  This is appealing 
in a sense that government uses the deficit for productive purposes including infrastructure 
investment which can “crowd-in” rather than “crowd-out” private corporate investment. Whatever 
be the framework he used, fiscal deficit reduction was given emphasis in his speech by curtailing 
“mindless populism” as well.  
II. New Monetary Policy Framework 
Even if for argument sake, we highlight that inflation is the most important obstacle for achieving 
macroeconomic stability and growth, the question remains. Is inflation strictly a monetary 
phenomenon in India? There are equally convincing discourses which highlight that supply side 
shocks determine inflation, in addition to the monetary determinants. The General Budget 2014-15 
has identified the need to tackle “price volatility in agriculture", by constituting a Price Stabilisation 
Fund of Rs 500 crores.However, the Iraq war and bad monsoon instil more supply side irregularities 
in price determination and the fiscal route to inflation management should have been spelt out more 
clearly in the budget.  Instead, the Finance Minister has emphasised the need for new monetary 
framework, which is a change, compared to earlier budgets.  
 In India, we have been accustomed to fiscal policy dominance, and always the first mover advantage 
in policy making was vested with budget policy makers. What I hint here as fiscal dominance is 
definitely not the financing of deficits through printing money (which is technically called as 
„seigniorage financing of deficits). We have come out of monetising deficits through printing money 
a few decades back. What I highlight here as a new macroeconomic consensus is the move towards 
providing more central bank independence in tackling inflation. If so, the framework of this budget 
raises concern. Is this really a new macroeconomic policy consensus? 
Given that the inflation in India during the last decade is the highest among the G-20 countries, it is 
pertinent to focus on inflation containment, as its macroeconomic consequences in terms of 
negative real interest rates and falling financial savings, depreciation-inflation spiral and worsening of 
income distribution (Report of RBI, 2014).  However, when there is a growing consensus across 
nations after the global financial crisis for central banks to move away from single role of price 
stability towards multiple indicator approach, Urjit Patel‟s report indicates a move towards inflation 
targeting in India. This report therefore raises a concern before the new government in terms of the 
degree of flexibility and linkages between central bank and government, technically the linkages 
between monetary policy and fiscal policy.  
The renewed debates towards independent, inflation targeting central bank has genesis in a series of 
three reports submitted -  Percy Mistry report, 2007; Raghuram Rajan report, 2009 and Financial 
Sector legislative Reforms Commission report (FSLRC), 2013. These three reports emphatically 
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directed the policy discourse towards price stability as the primary goal of central bank in India, and 
Urjit Patel report too forms a part of this camp in terms of monetary policy framework. This trend 
in monetary policy framework can cause a concern for the new government in terms of policy co-
ordination in containing inflation.  
The New Keynesian macroeconomics was transformed into what we now label as New Consensus 
Macroeconomics (NCM) (Arestis, 2009).  The major policy implications of the NCM paradigm are 
particularly important for inflation containment.  The NCM pitches that price stability can be 
achieved through monetary policy since inflation is a monetary phenomenon; as such it can only be 
controlled through changes in the rate of interest. It is, thus, agreed that monetary policy is effective 
as a means of inflation control (Arestis, 2009). This is controversial in the context of developing 
countries like India, as inflation is not strictly monetary process. The conceptual framework of 
inflation targeting in the context of India raises concern, even more after Finance Minister endorsing 
to having a “new monetary framework”.  
 
III. Revival of Economic Growth  
The fall in economic growth is attributed to global economic slowdown. Also, Government of India 
remained complacent about the fact that even after a decline; average growth was higher than the 
emerging market economies. The alternative arguments put forward by many others attributed this 
decline to the “policy paralysis”. Union Budget 2014 has taken some measures related to revival of 
growth which includes boost to infrastructure projects, a relook into mining regulations, a step 
forward to GST reforms and FDI in core sectors. The financial sector reforms and the steps 
towards financial inclusion also indicate a reinforcement of real and financial sector towards the 
revival of economic growth.  
IV. Institutions and Size of Government 
In recent years, institutions have become the central focus of economists studying the processes of 
growth and why nations have differed so greatly in their economic development goals (Nelson, 
2008, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). What are institutions exactly? North (1991) defines 
“institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction.” The big focus of the new government is on „less 
government‟ and maximum governance. The governance may also be market-oriented.  The 
appointment of Expenditure Reforms Commission, announced in the Union budget, is bold and 
welcome. However, the expenditure is concentrated in a few Departments of Government of India. 
As per the Union Budget 2014, around eight per cent of public expenditure is concentrated in 10 
Departments (Table 2).  
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Table 2 : Expenditure Budget across Departments  
 
Source: Government of India (2014) : Union Budget 2014 documents. 
 
I. Conclusion 
The economic growth plummeted.  Identifying the plausible policy priorities for growth revival is 
the single most significant agenda before the new government.  What wasthe policy priorities 
highlighted in Union Budget 2014? There is simultaneously continuity and a change. The change 
relates to the new macroeconomic consensus to undertake inflation management. The Finance 
Minister has endorsed the need for a “new monetary framework” in his budget speech. This 
announcement by Finance Minister needs to be co-read with the Urjit Patel recommendations for 
Central bank independence, and rules-based monetary policy. The shift of macroeconomic policies 
from discretion to rules – both in fiscal and monetary policy – a new consensus gaining momentum 
in India. Union Budget has set a broad path to address the issues related to “Policy paralysis”, which 
includes infrastructure investment, tax reforms, controlling bad subsidies and governance reforms.  
Though the revival of fiscal dominance is widely acknowledged, has a new discourse towards 
inflation targeting and central bank independence begun a new consensus in India, aftermath to 
Union Budget 2014? 
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